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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Olivia Schultz pleaded guilty to burglary and was sentenced to eight years,
with two years fixed. While there was substantial information before the district court
indicating that Ms. Schultz suffered from numerous mental health conditions, the district
court failed to order a mental health evaluation prior to sentencing. The district court
retained jurisdiction and eventually placed Ms. Schultz on probation.
Thereafter, Ms. Schultz admitted to several allegations of probation violations.
The district court placed her on a second period of retained jurisdiction, but
subsequently relinquished jurisdiction and executed her original sentence of eight years,
with two years fixed. Ms. Schultz timely appeals from her judgment of conviction and
sentence. On appeal, she asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it
failed to sua sponfe order a psychological evaluation for purposes of sentencing
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 and I.C.R. 32. Ms. Schultz further asserts that the district
court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over her case and executed
her original sentence,
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Olivia Schultz entered a restaurant late one evening in Burley, Idaho. (R., p.12.)
Ms. Schultz was crying and upset when she spoke to one of the employees of the
restaurant, Angela Garcia, who was preparing to close the restaurant for the night.

(R., p.12.) She told Ms. Garcia that she was trying to leave her husband, but that she
had no money for fuel. (R., p.13.)

Ms. Schultz then asked to use the phone, and

Ms. Garcia directed Ms. Schultz to a phone in the restaurant.

(R., p.13.)

While

Ms. Garcia went to take care of some other customers, she observed Ms. Schultz using
the phone and then saw Ms. Schultz leave the restaurant. (R., p.13.) Ms. Schultz was
apparently near the office where Ms. Garcia kept her purse while making the phone call.
(R., p.13.)
A short time later, Ms. Garcia went to get her purse so that she could retrieve her
keys to lock up the restaurant for the night. (R., p.13.) It was then that Ms. Garcia
noticed that her wallet was missing from her purse. (R. p.13.) Her wallet contained
personal identification, $40, and credit cards. (R., p.13.) She immediately called and
cancelled the credit cards in her wallet and notified police. (R., p.13.) A detective
handling the case thought that Ms. Garcia's description matched Ms. Schultz.
(R., p.13.) Upon being presented with a photographic line-up, Ms. Garcia identified Ms.

Schultz as the person that she believed stole her wallet. (R., p.13.)
Ms. Schultz was charged with grand theft of a financial transaction card and
burglary. (R., pp.19-20.) At her arraignment, Ms. Schultz pleaded guilty to burglary.
,
L.14 - p.17, L.18.) In exchange for her guilty plea, the State dropped
(319106 ~ r . ' p.13,
the charge of grand theft of a financial transaction card and recommended an
underlying sentence of eight years, with two years fixed. (319106 Tr., p.12, L.18 - p.13,
L.13.) Additionally, the State recommended that the district court suspend Ms. Schultz's
sentence and place her on probation. (319106 Tr., p.12, L.18 - p.13, L.13.) During the

' Because there are multiple volumes of transcripts of proceedings, citations to the
transcripts of proceedings herein will be made according to the date upon which the
proceedings occurred.

plea colloquy, Ms. Schultz revealed that she had previously been hospitalized for issues
related to several mental illnesses. (319106 Tr., p.15, L.17 - p.16, L.8.)
The district court sentenced Ms, Schultz to eight years, with two years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction for 180 days. (519106 Tr., p.17, Ls.1-5; R., p.39.) Twenty-one days
later, while Ms. Schultz was still serving her period of retained jurisdiction, she filed an
ldaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinaeer, Rule 35) motion seeking reduction of her sentence
that was supported with an accompanying affidavit.'

(R., pp.41, 46-48.) The district

court denied this motion. (R., pp.49-57,) Thereafter, Ms. Schultz timely appealed from
(R., pp.59-60.)
the district court's judgment of conviction and ~entence.~
The district court held a rider review hearing prior to the expiration of its period of
retained jurisdiction. (11/2/06 Tr., p.4, Ls.5-12.) After hearing the arguments of the
parties, the district court suspended Ms. Schultz's sentence and placed her on
~ , Ls.18-25; Suspension of Sentence and
probation for three years. (11/2/06 ~ r . p.15,
Order of Probation, Augment. 5, Although Ms. Schultz was accepted into mental health
--

'In light of the fact that Ms. Schultz's Rule 35 motion, and the affidavit filed in support of
this motion, did not contain new and additional information, Ms. Schultz does not herein
raise any issues on appeal with regard to the denial of this motion. See, e.g., State v.
Huffman, 144 ldaho 201,159 P.3d 838 (2007).
Ms. Schultz's Notice of Appeal was filed on July 21, 2006. (R., p.59.) However,
because the district court retained jurisdiction in this case, Ms. Schultz's notice of
appeal is timely from the original judgment of conviction because the time for filing her
appeal was expanded by the district court retaining jurisdiction over Ms. Schultz's case.
See I.A.R. 14; Appellant's Response to Conditional Dismissal, filed on August 14, 2006;
Order Reinstating Appeal, entered on September 13,2006.
The volume of transcripts of proceedings for the November 2, 2006 rider review
hearing also contains the transcripts for the hearings held on April 26, 2007 and May 3,
2007.
For ease of reference, because the two supplemental clerk's records requested and
ordered in this case were not bound or numbered when received from the district court
clerk, citations to the materials provided in accordance with the orders for supplemental
clerk's records will be made in accordance with the document title.

court, she initially declined to participate in that program. (December 15, 2006 letter
from Richard Neu, Mental Health Court Coordinator; Letter from Olivia Schultz to
Mr. Neu; Augment.)
Thereafter, the State filed a report of probation violations. (Report of Probation
Violation, Augment.) The State alleged that Ms. Schultz had violated the terms and
conditions of her probation by failing to pay costs and restitution, failing to check in with
her probation officer for drug testing, being untruthful with her employer, allegedly
selling prescription drugs to another person, changing residences without permission,
getting fired from two jobs, and declining to participate in the mental health court
program. (Report of Probation Violation, Augment, pp.1-5.) Ms. Schultz admitted to the
State's allegations of probation violations. (513107 Tr., p.25, L.24

- p.26, L.1.)

Based upon Ms. Schultz's representations that she wished to participate in
mental health court, the district court delayed disposition on the allegations of probation
violations. (513107 Tr., p.32, L . l l

- p.36, L.18.)

Ultimately, Ms. Schultz did not meet the

criteria for mental health court. (7119107 Tr., p.8, Ls.19-24.) The district court revoked
Ms. Schultz's probation. (7119107 Tr., p.11, Ls.4-6.) However, in view of the pervasive
mental health issues that Ms. Schultz was struggling with, the district court retained
jurisdiction over her case a second time. (7119107 Tr., p.11, Ls.4-6; Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Order Re: Probation Violation and Order of Commitment,
Augment.)
Prior to the expiration of the district court's period of retained jurisdiction, the
court relinquished jurisdiction and imposed the original sentence of eight years, with two
years fixed. (12/14107 Tr., p.16, Ls.9-16; Order on Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction,

Augment, p.3.)

Ms. Schultz timely appeals from the district court's judgment of

conviction and sentence. (R., pp.59-60.)

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to sua sponfe order a
mental health evaluation for purposes of sentencing in this case?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over
Ms. Schultz's case and executed her original sentence of eight years, with two
years fixed?

ARGUMENT
1.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Sua S~onfeOrder A Mental
Health Evaluation Pursuant To I.C.R. 32 And I.C. 6 19-2522 For Purposes Of
Sentencing In This Case
Under ldaho Criminal Rule 32(d), the district court may order a psychological
evaluation of the defendant to be used in determining the defendant's sentence. The
decision of whether to order a psychological evaluation is generally within the discretion
of the district court. I.C.R. 32(d); Sfafe v. McFarland, 125 ldaho 786, 878-879, 876 P.2d
158, 160-161 (Ct. App. 1994).

However, the court may be required to order a

psychological evaluation of the mental condition of the defendant if there is "reason to
believe that the mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at
sentencing, and for good cause shown." I.C.

3 19-2522(1); McFarland, 125 ldaho at

879, 876 P.2d at 161. A court may be required to sua sponte order a psychological
report for sentencing if the failure to do so constitutes "manifest disregard for the
provisions of I.C.R. 32," even if the defendant never requests such a report. State v.
Craner, 137 ldaho 188, 191,45 P.3d 844,847 (Ct. App. 2002).
In Idaho, the sentencing decisions of the district court are generally reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. State V. Burdett, 134 ldaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct. App.
2000). The decision of whether to order a psychological evaluation is among those
sentencing decisions that this Court reviews for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,
Sfate v. Hyde, 127 ldaho 140, 150, 898 P.2d 71, 81 (Ct. App. 1995). When a district
court's discretionary determination is reviewed on appeal, this Court conducts a multitiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the district court correctly perceived the issue

as one of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted within the bounds of its
discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the district
court reached its decision through an exercise of reason. See, e.g., State v. Rauch,
144 ldaho 682, 685, 168 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Ct. App. 2007). The second inquiry is the
primary issue for this Court's resolution in this case: whether, in light of the applicable
legal standards governing when a psychological evaluation is mandatory for sentencing,
the district court abused its discretion in this case. This Court exercises free review
over whether the district court properly applied the applicable legal standards to the
facts of a particular case. Stafe v. Eddins, 142 ldaho 423, 425, 128 P.3d 960, 962
(Ct. App. 2006).
There are several factors that may put the district court on notice that a
psychological report is required under I.C.R. 32. Uncharacteristic or irrational behavior
at the time the offense was committed is relevant to whether a psychological report is
required. Craner, 137 ldaho at 191, 45 P.3d at 847. Whether the defendant's past
criminal history included crimes of violence of a similar nature is also relevant. Id. In
evaluating whether the district court was required to order a psychological report, this
Court also may look to the information contained within, or omitted by, the presentence
reports. Stafe V. Adams, 137 ldaho 275, 277, 47 P.3d 778, 780 (Ct. App. 2002). This
Court may also consider the district court's comments regarding the mental health of the
defendant in determining whether it was error for the district court not to sua sponte
order a mental health evaluation. Craner, 137 ldaho at 191,45 P.3d at 847; McFarland,

125 Idaho at 881, 876 P.2d at 163.

The information contained within the Presentence Investigation Report
(hereinafter, PSI) demonstrated that Ms. Schultz suffered from numerous mental
conditions, tracing back to her childhood, which operated jointly to impact her behavior
and decision-making. (PSI, pp.16-31.) Specifically, there were three psychological
evaluations conducted on Ms. Schultz from when she was 16 and 17 years old. (PSI,
pp.16-31.) These evaluations attested to the severe traumas that Ms. Schultz received
in her most probative years, and traced these traumas through to the behavioral issues
and mental conditions that Ms. Schultz exhibited as a young adult. (PSI, pp.16-31.)
These evaluations either diagnosed or found indications that Ms. Schultz
suffered from depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, fetal alcohol syndrome,
conduct disorders, and potentially multiple personality disorder. (PSI, pp.16-17, 21-22,
27.) As a result of these conditions, Ms. Schultz struggled with a truncated general fund
of knowledge, a lack of ability to make social judgments based upon past experiences,
difficulty in concentrating, and a need to act out in negative ways in order to obtain any
attention from the people around her. (PSI, pp.17-18, 20,26.)
In addition, the presentence investigator's remarks also indicated the need for a
mental health evaluation for purposes of sentencing. After summarizing the
psychological evaluations conducted on Ms. Schultz as a teenager, the investigator
opined that, "It would be to [Ms. Schultz's] benefit to follow through with Mr. Waite's
recommendation to participate in individual therapy." (PSI, p.9.) The evaluator also
recommended a substance abuse evaluation. (PSI, p.11.)
The rationale behind the presentence investigator's recommendation that the
district court place Ms. Schultz on a rider also demonstrates why a psychological

evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 was necessary in this case. The investigator
commented that the most important reason for the recommendation of retained
jurisdiction was so that Ms. Schultz could be evaluated to determine, inter alia, what
programs could best assess her mental health needs. (PSI, p . . ) The evaluator then
went on to note that, upon completion of these evaluations and the rider program, "the
Court will have additional information with which to make a more informed sentencing
decision." (PSI, p.1I.)
Upon announcing that the court was retaining jurisdiction, the district court also
noted that, while serving her rider, "they can address her substance abuse issues and
assess her mental health needs there.'"

(519106 Tr., p.16, Ls.20-22.)

While the

presentence investigator and the district court were correct in concluding that an
evaluation of Ms. Schultz's mental health conditions would provide the court with the
information necessary to make an informed sentencing decision, pertinent case law
reveals that this evaluation must be completed before sentencing. As noted by the
Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Coonfs:
Nor does the availability of a mental health evaluation by the Department
of Correction satisfy the statutory mandate. Section 19-2522 does not
require a psychological evaluation merely to enlighten correctional officials
who must make decisions on the defendant's conditions of confinement
and treatment while incarcerated; the statute requires that the evaluation
be conducted before sentencing so that the trial court will have the
benefits of the evaluator's insights in fashioning an appropriate sentence.
This Court may wish to note that this mental health evaluation appears to have never
occurred while Ms. Schultz was on her rider. According to the addendum to the
presentence report, as the evaluator made the recommendation that, "Ms. Schultz
engage in a complete psychological evaluation," after the evaluator had reviewed the
psychological materials contained in the presentence investigation report. (10/26/06
APS, p.5.) However, a limited mental health evaluation was conducted during Ms.
Schultz's second period of retained jurisdiction. (12/10/07 APSI, attached Mental
Health Evaluation.)

State V. Coonts, 137 ldaho 150, 153, 44 P.3d 1205, 1208 (Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis in
the original). And ldaho Courts have specifically considered

- and

rejected

- the

propriety of waiting until a defendant is serving his or her rider before ordering a mental
health evaluation. Stafe v. Banbuny, 145 ldaho 265, 269, 178 P.3d 630, 634 (Ct. App.
2007). According to the mandates of I.C. $! 19-2522, these evaluations must be ordered
before sentencing itself in order to ensure that the purposes of the legislature in
enacting this statute are fulfilled. Id.
Moreover, the records of the proceedings, arguments of the parties, and
statements from the district court all indicated an awareness of the centrality of
Ms. Schultz's mental conditions to her culpability for her offense and to sentencing. At
the change of plea hearing, Ms. Schultz made the district court aware that she suffered
from numerous mental health conditions, including post-traumatic stress disorder, that
resulted from extensive abuse. (319106 Tr., p.15, L.17 - p.16, L.8.)
At the sentencing hearing, both Ms. Schultz and the State made several
comments about Ms. Schultz's mental health issues and how these should impact the
district court's determination as to sentencing. (519106 Tr., p.6, Ls.2-16; p.9, L.12
p.10, L.15.)

-

Defense counsel specifically argued that Ms. Schultz's "mental state

certainly played a role in her commission of this crime." (519106 Tr., p.9, L.12

- p.10,

L.15.) And the district court acknowledged, while discussing the factors contributing to
her sentence, that Ms. Schultz had mental health issues. (519106 Tr., p.15, Ls.15-17.)
In contrast to the multiple indications that Ms. Schultz's mental conditions would
be a significant factor at sentencing, the materials relied on by the trial court at
sentencing did not otherwise provide the information required under I.C. $j19-2522(3).

This Court may uphold the district court's failure to order a psychological examination "if
the information already before the court adequately meets the requirements of I.C. 3 192522(3)." Craner, 137 Idaho at 190, 45 P.3d at 846. The materials relied on by the
district court did not meet the statutory criteria.
Under I.C. $j19-2522(3), the psychological report ordered by the district court
must include the following information: (I) a description of the nature of the
examination; (2) a diagnosis, evaluation, or prognosis of the mental condition of the
defendant; (3) an analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect and level of
functional impairment; (4) a consideration of whether treatment is available for the
defendant's mental condition; (5) an analysis of the relative risks and benefits of
treatment or non-treatment; and (6) a consideration of the risk of danger which the
defendant may create for the public if at large. The record relied on by the district court
did not adequately meet these requirements, and failed to even address several of the
key elements of the statutory requirements.
While there were several documents attached to the presentence investigation
report that indicate pervasive and severe mental health conditions ultimately stemming
from Ms. Schultz's abusive childhood, these assessments occurred in 1992 and 1993 approximately 13 years prior to the offense at issue in this appeal. (PSI, pp.16-31.)
Given the protracted length of time that had passed between her psychological
evaluations and the district court's sentencing, the district court should have ordered a
new mental health evaluation in order to determine the degree to which Ms. Schultz's
documented mental conditions continued to impact her decisions and actions as an
adult.

Additionally, the psychological reports generated when Ms. Schultz was a
teenage girl also do not address many of the considerations cogent to sentencing that
are required pursuant to LC. § 19-2522. Of particular note, these reports did not
provide the district court with any information regarding the relative risks and benefits of
treatment versus non-treatment for Ms. Schultz as an adult, an analysis of the degree of
the her mental illness or defect and level of functional impairment, nor did they address
in any respect any consideration of the risk of danger which Ms. Schultz may create for
the public if at large.
Court-ordered psychological evaluations pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 can assist
the sentencing court in assessing the defendant's capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his or her conduct and his or her general culpability for the underlying
offense. State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364, 366, 195 P.3d 723, 725 (Ct. App. 2008).
Given the central bearing that these reports may have in the fashioning of an
appropriate underlying sentence in a case, the materials already before the district court
on Ms. Schultz's mental health conditions did not adequately meet the requirements of
I.C.

3

19-2522(3). As such, the district court abused its discretion, and acted in

manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32, when it failed to sua sponfe order a mental health
evaluation, conducted pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522, for purposes of sentencing in this
case.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over
Ms. Schultz's Case And Executed Her Oriqinal Sentence Of Eight Years. With Two
Years Fixed
In light of the substantial and compelling mitigating factors in Ms. Schultz's case,
the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction, rather than place
Ms. Schultz on a second period of probation, and when the district court failed to sua
sponfe reduce her sentence pursuant to Rule 35 upon relinquishing jurisdiction.
A.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over
Ms. Schultz's Case. Rather Than Place Her On A Second Period Of Probation
The primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to enable the district

court to gain additional information about the defendant's rehabilitative potential and
suitability for probation. See, e.g., Sfafe v. Lutes, 141 ldaho 911, 915, 120 P.3d 299,
303 (Ct. App. 2005). In turn, the purpose of probation is to give the defendant an
opportunity to be rehabilitated under proper control and supervision. Sfafe v. Wakefield,
145 ldaho 270, 273, 178 P.3d 635, 638 (Ct. App. 2007). A district court's decision to
relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Sfaffon,
136 ldaho 135, 137, 30 P.3d 290, 292 (2001). In this case, the district court abused its
discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over Ms. Schultz's case instead of placing her
on probation.
Ms. Schultz's earliest years were fraught with trauma, as prior to her fifth
birthday, "she was the victim of constant physical and sexual abuse." (PSI I 1 This
violent imprint made in her most formative years left Ms. Schultz with numerous mental
conditions that started her on a path that led to a childhood of acting out, and that

ultimate led to her conviction in this case. (PSI, pp.5-6, 11.) This included diagnoses
for fetal alcohol syndrome, depressionldysthymic disorder, and conduct disorders in her
teenage years. (PSI, pp.1 I,
22.')
Prior to being adopted, Ms. Schultz suffered abuse and neglect at the hands of
her mother until she was two or three years old. (PSI, p.20.) She was then shuffled
from home to home for several years before finally finding a permanent adoptive family.
(PSI, p.20.) According to past psychological examinations, as a direct result of the
abuse visited upon her as a child, Ms. Schultz tends to act out negatively as a means of
seeking the attention that she does not otherwise believe that she deserves. (PSI,
p.18.) In addition to her struggles with mental illness, Ms. Schultz has also attempted to
self-medicate w~thalcohol and drugs from a very young age. (PSI, pp.9-10.)
While Ms. Schultz does have a prior criminal history, the offense at issue in this
appeal appears to be her first and only felony. (PSI, pp.3-4.) Given her lack of a
substantial criminal record, coupled with her long-term struggles with mental illness and
substance abuse, there is every probability that, with appropriate treatment and
oversight, Ms. Schultz will be able to further her own rehabilitation.
When Ms. Schultz participated in her first rider, she worked very hard to
complete all of the programming that she was assigned. (10126106 Addendum to the
Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafier, APSI), pp.1-2.) She also went beyond
the assigned courses to obtain her food-handler's card, read 44 self-help books,
attended church functions and numerous ANNA meetings, did 76 hours of volunteer

The un-numbered pages of the presentence investigation report are referred to herein
in accordance with consecutive hand-numbering of the pages, beginning at page 13.
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work, and attempted to further her physical well-being by participating in yoga classes.
(10/26/06 APSI, p.2.) Ms. Schultz's overall performance demonstrates that, given the
appropriate level of oversight and personal dedication, she can be a successful and
contributing member of her community.
Under a review of the entire record in this case, the district court abused its
discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over Ms. Schultz's case rather than place her
on a second period of probation
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Sua Sponte Reduce
Ms. Schultz's Sentence Pursuant To Rule 35 Upon Relincluishincl Jurisdiction
Over Her Case
At the end of a period of retained jurisdiction, the district court may suspend the

sentence and place the defendant on probation or may relinquish jurisdiction and
execute the defendant's sentence. Lutes, 141 ldaho at 915, 120 P.3d at 303. If the
court relinquishes jurisdiction, the district court may also reduce the defendant's
sentence pursuant to Rule 35 at that time. Id. "It is common practice for a trial court to
impose a rather severe underlying sentence as an incentive for the defendant to
perform well in the retained jurisdiction program and to comply with probation terms if
the defendant is ultimately placed on probation." State v. Jones, 141 ldaho 673, 676,
115 P.3d 764, 767 (Ct. App. 2005). Given that the sentence originally pronounced by

the district court may be artificially enlarged as a hedge against uncertainty, it is
important to review the appropriateness of this sentence upon the court's determination
to relinquish jurisdiction.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record,

giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 ldaho 771, 653 P.2d 1183
(Ct. App. 1982). The ldaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within
statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on
the part of the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 ldaho 293, 294,
939 P.2d 1372, 1373 (1997) (quoting Stafe v. Cotfon, 100 ldaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71,
75 (1979)).

The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:

(I)

protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.

Id.,

quoting State v. Wolfe, 99 ldaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978).
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,
125 ldaho 251, 253, 869 P.2d 568, 570 (Ct. App. 1994), citing State v. Forde, 113 ldaho
21, 740 P.2d 63 (Ct. App.1987) and State v. Lopez, 106 ldaho 447, 680 P.2d 869
(Ct. App. 1984). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are
the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was
reasonable." Id., citing Lopez, 106 ldaho at 450, 680 P.2d at 872.
Here, a review of the entire record in this case reveals that the district court
abused its discretion when it failed to sua sponfe reduce Ms. Schultz's sentence upon
relinquishing jurisdiction over her case. As noted above, Ms. Schultz's offense and her
past behavior are largely attributable to severe mental health issues flowing from an
abusive and unstable early childhood, Moreover, the offense at issue in this appeal was

fairly de minimus: she stole only $40 and never caused or threatened any physical
harm to anyone during the commission of her offense. See I.C. §§ 19-2521(a), (b).
Given that Ms. Schultz does not have any history of prior felonies, and can likely lead a
successful and law-abiding life given appropriate treatments for her substance
addictions and mental health issues, the district court abused its discretion when it failed
to sua sponte reduce her sentence upon relinquishing jurisdiction over her case.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Schultz respectfully requests that this Court vacate her sentence and
remand this case to district court for resentencing after a complete evaluation of her
mental condition is made in compliance with I.C. § 19-2522.

In the alternative,

Ms. Schultz asks that this Court vacate the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction
and remand this case for further proceedings. Alternatively, she requests that this Court
reduce her sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 3rdday of September, 2009.
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